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Abstract 
The EMU accession countries are obliged to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria prior to 
entering the EMU. What should be the optimal monetary policy satisfying these criteria? To answer 
this question, the paper proposes a DSGE model of a two-sector small open economy. 
First, I derive the micro founded loss function that represents the objective function of the 
optimal monetary policy not constrained to satisfy the criteria. I find that the optimal monetary policy 
should not only target inflation rates in the domestic sectors and aggregate output fluctuations but also 
domestic and international terms of trade. Second, I show how the loss function changes when the 
monetary policy is constrained to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. The loss function of such a 
constrained policy is characterized by additional elements penalizing fluctuations of the CPI inflation 
rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate around the new targets which are 
different from the steady state of the unconstrained optimal monetary policy. 
Under the chosen parameterization, the optimal monetary policy violates two criteria: 
concerning the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. The constrained optimal policy is 
characterized by a deflationary bias. This results in targeting the CPI inflation rate and the nominal 
interest rate that are 0.7% lower (in annual terms) than the CPI inflation rate and the nominal interest 
rate in the countries taken as a reference. Such a policy leads to additional welfare costs amounting to 
30% of the optimal monetary policy loss. 
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1 Introduction
On May 1, 2004 eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe (i.e. Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) together with Cyprus and Malta entered
the European Union (EU). Importantly, the Accession Treaty signed by all these countries includes
an obligation to participate in the third stage of the economic and monetary union, i.e. an obligation
to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the near future. Moreover, in order to enter the
EMU, these countries are required to satisfy the Maastricht convergence criteria (Treaty of Maastricht,
Article 109j(1)). The criteria are designed to guarantee that prior to joining the European Monetary
Union, countries attain a high degree of economic convergence not only in real but also in nominal
terms. To this end, the Article 109j(1) of the Maastricht Treaty lays down the following criteria as a
prerequisite for entering the EMU:1
 the achievement of a high degree of price stability which means that a Member State (of the
EU) has a sustainable price performance and an average rate of ination (the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) ination), observed over a period of one year before the examination, which does
not exceed that of the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability by more
than 1.5% points (the CPI ination rate criterion);
 the durability of the convergence ... reected in the long term interest rate levels which means
that, over a period of one year before the examination, a Member State has an average nominal
long-term interest rate that does not exceed that of the three best performing Member States
in terms of price stability by more than 2% points (the nominal interest rate criterion);
 the observance of the normal uctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism
of the European Monetary System (15% bound around the central parity), for at least two years,
without devaluing against the currency of any other Member State (the nominal exchange rate
criterion).
By setting constraints on the monetary variables, these criteria a¤ect the way monetary policy
should be conducted in the EMU accession countries. Importantly, monetary policy plays a crucial
role in the stabilization process of an economy exposed to shocks. The stochastic environment of the
EMU accession countries has both domestic and external origins. As far as the domestic environment
is concerned, a strong productivity growth has been observed in the EMU accession countries in the
last years (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A). Moreover, all these countries are small open economies
which also makes them vulnerable to external shocks (see Table A.1 in Appendix A).
1 Importantly, the Maastricht Treaty also imposes the criterion on the scal policy, i.e. the sustainability of the gov-
ernment nancial position which refers to a government budgetary position without an excessive decit (Article 104c(6)
of the Maastricht Treaty). However, in this paper, we focus on the monetary aspects of the Maastricht convergence
criteria.
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An obligation to fulll the Maastricht convergence criteria by the EMU accession countries can
restrict the stabilization role of the monetary policy. At the moment, many EMU accession countries
do not satisfy some of the Maastricht convergence criteria. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania
and Slovakia fail to fulll the CPI ination rate criterion (see Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix
A). Moreover, Hungary also violates the nominal interest rate criterion (see Figures A.4 and A.5 in
Appendix A). On the other hand, the nominal exchange rate uctuations versus the euro for all EMU
accession countries remain within the band set by the nominal exchange rate criterion (see Figure A.6
in Appendix A).
Keeping this in mind, two natural questions arise. Are the Maastricht convergence criteria compat-
ible with the optimal monetary policy in the EMU accession countries? What are the characteristics
of the optimal policy that satises the Maastricht convergence criteria? The goal of this paper is to
answer these questions. To this purpose, we develop a DSGE model of a small open economy with
nominal rigidities exposed to both domestic and external shocks.
The production structure of the economy is composed of two sectors: a nontraded good sector
and a traded good sector. There are several reasons why we decide to impose such a structure in our
model. According to the literature, the existence of the nontraded sector helps us explain international
business cycle uctuations and especially real exchange rate movements (e.g. Benigno and Thoenisen
(2003), Corsetti et al. (2003), Stockman and Tesar (1994)). Moreover, the empirical studies regarding
the OECD countries nd that a major part of the aggregate uctuations rather have their source in
sector-specic than country-wide shocks (e.g. Canzoneri et al. (1999), Marimon and Zilibotti (1998)).
Finally, we want to match our model with the empirical literature on the EMU accession countries
that emphasizes the role of sector productivity shocks in shaping ination and real exchange rate
patterns in these countries (e.g. Mihaljek and Klau (2004)).
In this framework, we characterize the optimal monetary policy from a timeless perspective (Wood-
ford (2003)). We derive the micro founded loss function using the second-order approximation method-
ology developed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Benigno and Woodford (2005). We nd that
the optimal monetary policy (unconstrained policy) should not only target ination rates in the do-
mestic sectors and aggregate output uctuations, but also domestic and international terms of trade.
Since the Maastricht convergence criteria are not easily implementable in our model, we reformulate
them using the methodology developed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) for the analysis of
the zero bound problem of the nominal interest rate. This method enables us to verify whether a given
criterion is satised by only computing rst and second moments of a variable for which the criterion
is set. We focus on the criteria imposed on the CPI ination rate, the nominal interest rate and the
nominal exchange rate as we do not explicitly model the scal policy. Moreover, we present how the
loss function changes when the monetary policy is constrained by the Maastricht convergence crite-
ria. Finally, we derive the optimal monetary policy that satises all Maastricht convergence criteria
(constrained policy).
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Under the chosen parameterization (which aims at reecting the Czech Republic economy), the
optimal monetary policy violates two Maastricht convergence criteria: concerning the CPI ination
rate and the nominal interest rate. The optimal policy which satises these two criteria also guarantees
satisfaction of the nominal exchange criterion. Both the stabilization component and the determin-
istic component of the constrained policy are di¤erent from the unconstrained optimal policy. The
constrained policy leads to a smaller variability of the CPI ination, the nominal interest rate and the
nominal exchange rate than under optimal monetary policy. Moreover, it is also characterized by a
deationary bias which results in targeting a CPI ination rate and a nominal interest rate that are
0.7% lower (in annual terms) than the CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate in the reference
countries. As a result, the policy constrained by the Maastricht convergence criteria induces addi-
tional welfare costs which amount to 30% of the initial deadweight loss associated with the optimal
monetary policy.
The literature has so far concentrated on two aspects of monetary policy in the EMU accession
countries: the appropriate monetary regime in the light of the future accession to the EMU and also
the ability of the alternative monetary regimes to comply with the Maastricht convergence criteria.
The rst stream of literature represented by, among others, Buiter and Grafe (2003), Coricelli (2002),
calls for adopting the peg regime to the euro in these countries, as it enhances the credibility of the
monetary policy and also strengthens the links with the EU and the EMU. Moreover, using a DSGE
model with nominal rigidities and imperfect credibility, Ravenna (2005) nds that the gain from a
credible adoption of the xed regime towards the euro can outweigh the loss of resignation from the
independent monetary policy. Nevertheless, Buiter and Grafe (2003) also claim that an adoption of
the xed regime can seriously endanger the fulllment of the CPI ination criterion and therefore call
for a change in this criterion. Their reasoning is based on the empirical studies regarding sources of
the CPI ination and real exchange rate developments in the EMU accession countries. A majority
of the studies2 concentrate on the BalassaSamuelson e¤ect (Balassa (1964)), which predicts that
countries experiencing a higher productivity growth in the traded sector are also characterized by a
higher CPI ination rate and real exchange rate appreciation. Others (e.g. Mihaljek and Klau (2004))
also highlight the role of productivity shocks in the nontraded sector in a¤ecting the CPI ination
rate and the real exchange rate appreciation in the EMU accession countries.3
The second stream of the literature builds an analysis in the framework of open economy DSGE
models. Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) nd that the monetary regime character-
ized by exible ination targeting with some weight on exchange rate stability succeeds in fullling the
Maastricht criteria. Two other studies are also worth noting: Laxton and Pesenti (2003) and Ferreira
(2006). The authors of the rst paper study how di¤erent interest rate rules perform in stabilizing
2We can list the following empirical studies that analyze CPI ination and real exchange rate developments in the
EMU accession countries: Cipriani (2001), de Broeck and Slok (2001), Egert et al. (2002), Fisher (2002), Halpern and
Wyplosz (2001), Coricelli and Jazbec (2001), Arratibel et al. (2002), Mihaljek and Klau (2004).
3This study goes in line with a recent paper by Altissimo et al (2004) on the sources of ination di¤erentials in the
euro area. The authors nd that the nontraded sector (proxied as the service sector) contributes the most to price
dispersion among member countries.
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variability of ination and output in a small open economy. The second paper focuses on calculation
of the welfare loss that the EMU accession countries will face when they join the EMU. However,
contrary to our study, it does not provide the micro founded welfare criterion.
In contrast to previous studies, our analysis is characterized by the normative approach. We
construct the optimal monetary policy for a small open economy and contrast it with the optimal
policy that is also restricted to satisfy the Maastricht convergence criteria. Therefore, our framework
enables us to set guidelines on the way in which monetary policy should be conducted in the EMU
accession countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and derives
the small open economy dynamics. Section 3 describes derivation of the optimal monetary policy.
Section 4 presents the way we reformulate the Maastricht convergence criteria in order to implement
them in our framework. Section 5 is dedicated to the derivation of the optimal policy constrained by
the Maastricht convergence criteria. Section 6 compares the optimal monetary policy with the optimal
monetary policy constrained by the Maastricht convergence criteria under the chosen parameterization
of the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Our modelling framework is based on a one-sector small open economy model of de Paoli (2004)
where all goods, i.e. home and foreign ones, are tradable. We extend this model by incorporating two
domestic sectors, i.e. a nontraded and a traded sector. Our model is also closely related to the studies
of Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). However, we relax an assumption present
in their studies regarding perfect competition and homogeneity of goods in the traded sector, which
enables us to discuss a role of terms of trade in the stabilization process of a small open economy. In
that way our modelling framework is similar to a two-country model with two production sectors of
Liu and Pappa (2005).
Following de Paoli (2004), we model a small open economy as the limiting case of a two-country
problem, i.e. where the size of the small open economy is set to zero. In the general framework, the
model represents two economies of unequal size: a small open home economy and a foreign large
economy (which is proxied as the euro area). We consider two highly integrated economies where
asset markets are complete. In each of the economies, there are two goods sectors: nontraded goods
and traded goods. Moreover, we assume that labour is mobile between sectors in each country and
immobile between countries. We assume the existence of home bias in consumption which, in turn,
depends on the relative size of the economy and its degree of openness. This assumption enables us
to consider a limiting case of the zero size of the home economy and concentrate on the small open
economy.
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is violated for two reasons: existence of the nontraded sector
and home bias in consumption. Furthermore, in order to study the role of monetary policy in this
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framework, we introduce monopolistic competition and price rigidities with staggered Calvo contracts
in all goods sectors. However, we abstract from any monetary frictions by assuming cashless limiting
economies.4 The stochastic environment of the small open economy is characterized by asymmetric
productivity shocks originating in both domestic sectors, preference shocks and foreign consumption
shocks.
2.1 Households
The world economy consists of a continuum of agents of unit mass: [0; n) belonging to a small country
(home) and [n; 1] belonging to the rest of the world, i.e. the euro area (foreign). There are two types of
di¤erentiated goods produced in each country: traded and nontraded goods. Home traded goods are
indexed on the interval [0; n) and foreign traded goods on the interval [n; 1], respectively. The same
applies to nontraded goods. In order to simplify the exposition of the model, we explain in detail only
the structure and dynamics of the domestic economy. Thus, from now on, we assume the size of the
domestic economy to be zero, i.e. n! 0.
Households are assumed to live innitely and behave according to the permanent income hypoth-
esis. They can choose between three types of goods: nontraded, domestic traded and foreign traded
goods. Cit represents consumption at period t of a consumer i and L
i
t constitutes his labour supply.
Each agent i maximizes the following utility function:5
maxEt0
( 1X
t=t0
t t0

U
 
Cit ; Bt
  V  Lit
)
; (2.1)
where Et0 denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at date t0,  is the intertemporal
discount factor and 0 <  < 1; U() stands for ows of utility from consumption and V () represents
ows of disutility from supplying labour.6 C is a composite consumption index. We dene consumers
preferences over the composite consumption index Ct of traded goods (CT;t) (domestically produced
and foreign ones) and nontraded goods (CN;t):
Ct 


1
C
 1

N;t + (1  )
1
C
 1

T;t
 
 1
; (2.2)
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods and  2 [0; 1] is the
share of the nontraded goods in overall consumption. Traded good consumption is a composite of the
domestically produced traded goods (CH) and foreign produced traded goods (CF ):
4See Woodford (2003).
5 In general, we assume U to be twice di¤erentiable, increasing and concave in Ct and V to be twice di¤erentiable,
increasing and convex in Lt.
6We assume specic functional forms of consumption utility U
 
Cit

, and disutility from labour V
 
Lit

: U
 
Cit
 
(Cit)
1 
B

t
1  ; V
 
Lit
  'l (Lit)1+1+ with  ( > 0), the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
and  (  0), the inverse of labour supply elasticity and Bt ; preference shock.
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CT;t 
h
(1  ) 1C
 1

H;t + 
1
C
 1

F;t
i 
 1
; (2.3)
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home traded and foreign traded goods, and  is
the degree of openness of the small open economy ( 2 [0; 1]).7 Finally, Cj (where j = N; H; F ) are
consumption sub-indices of the continuum of di¤erentiated goods:
Cj;t 
24 1
n
 1

nZ
0
ct (j)
 1
 dj
35  1 ; (2.4)
where  > 1 represents elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods in each of the sectors.
Based on the above presented preferences, we derive consumption-based price indices expressed in the
units of currency of the domestic country:
Pt 
h
P 1 N;t + (1  )P 1 T;t
i 1
1 
; (2.5)
PT;t 
h
P 1 H;t + (1  )P 1 F;t
i 1
1 
(2.6)
with
Pj;t 
24 1
n
 nZ
0
pt (j)
1 
dj
35 11  : (2.7)
Although we assume the law of one price in the traded sector (i.e. p(h) = Sp(h) and p(f) = Sp(f)
where S is the nominal exchange rate), both the existence of the nontraded goods and the assumed
home bias cause deviations from purchasing power parity, i.e. P 6= SP . The real exchange rate can
be dened in the following manner: RS  SPP : Moreover, we dene the international terms of trade
as T  PFPH and the ratio of nontraded to traded goodsprices (domestic terms of trade) as T d  PNPT :
From consumer preferences, we can derive total demand for the generic goods n (home nontraded
ones), h (home traded ones), f (foreign traded ones):
yd(n) =

p(n)
PN
  
PN
P
 
C; (2.8)
yd(h) =

p(h)
PH
  
PH
PT
 
(1  )CT +

p(h)
P H
  
P H
P T
 
CT ; (2.9)
7Following de Paoli (2004) and Sutherland (2002), we assume home bias () of the domestic households to be a
function of the relative size of the home economy with respect to the foreign one (n) and its degree of openness () such
that (1  ) = (1  n) where  2 [0; 1]: Importantly, the higher is the degree of openness, the smaller is the degree of
home bias. Since n! 0, we obtain that  = 1  :
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yd(f) =

p(f)
P F
  
P F
P T
 
CT (2.10)
where variables with an asterisk represent the foreign equivalents of the domestic variables. Impor-
tantly, since the domestic economy is a small open economy, demand for foreign traded goods does not
depend on domestic demand. However, at the same time, demand for domestic traded goods depends
on foreign demand.
Households get disutility from supplying labour to all rms present in each country. Each individual
supplies labour to both sectors, i.e. the traded and the nontraded sector:
Lit = L
i;H
t + L
i;N
t : (2.11)
We assume that consumers have access to a complete set of securities-contingent claims traded
internationally. Each household faces the following budget constraint:
PtC
i
t + EtfQt;t+1Dt+1g  Dt + TRit +W iH;tLiH;t +W iN;tLiN;t +
nR
0
iN;tdi
n
+
nR
0
iH;tdi
n
; (2.12)
where at date t, Dt+1 is nominal payo¤ of the portfolio held at the end of period (t), Qt;t+1 is the
stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead nominal payo¤s relevant to the domestic household,
H;t and N;t are nominal prots from the domestic rms and TRit are nominal lump-sum transfers
from the domestic government to household i. Moreover, consumers face no Ponzi game restriction.
The short-term interest rate (Rt) is dened as the price of the portfolio which delivers one unit of
currency in each contingency that occurs in the next period:8
R 1t = EtfQt;t+1g: (2.13)
The maximization problem of any household consists of maximizing the discounted stream of utility
(2.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.12) in order to determine the optimal path of the consumption
index, the labour index and contingent claims at all times. The solution to the household decision
problem gives a set of rst-order conditions.9 Optimization of the portfolio holdings leads to the
following Euler equations for the domestic economy:
UC(Ct; Bt) = Et

UC(Ct+1; Bt+1)Q
 1
t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1

: (2.14)
There is a perfect sharing in this setting, meaning that marginal rates of consumption in nominal
8Following the literature, we assume one period to be one quarter.
9We here suppress subscript i as we assume that in equilibrium, all agents are identical. Therefore, we represent
optimality conditions for a representative agent.
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terms are equalized between countries in all states and at all times.10 Subsequently, appropriately
choosing the distribution of initial wealth, we obtain the risk sharing condition:
UC(Ct; Bt)
UC(Ct ; Bt )
= 
Pt
StP t
= RS 1t ; (2.15)
where  > 0 and depends on the initial wealth distribution. The risk sharing condition implies that
the real exchange rate is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between domestic and foreign
consumption.
The optimality condition for labour supply in the domestic economy is the following:
W kt
Pt
=
VL(Lt)
UC(Ct; Bt)
; (2.16)
where W k is the nominal wage of the representative consumer in sector k (k = H;N):11 So the real
wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption.
2.2 Firms
All rms are owned by consumers. Both traded and nontraded sectors are monopolistically competi-
tive. The production function is linear in labour which is the only input. Consequently, its functional
form for rm i in sector k (k = N; H) is the following:
Yk;t(i) = A
k
tL
k
t (i): (2.17)
Price is set according to the Calvo (1983) pricing scheme. In each period, a fraction of rms
(1 k) decides its price, thus maximizing the future expected prots. The maximization problem of
any rm in sector k at time t0 is given by:
max
Pk;t0 (i)
Et0
1X
t=to
(k)
sQt0;t

(1  k)Pk;t0(i) MCkt (i)

Y dk;t0:t(i)
subject to Y dk;t0:t(i) =

Pk;t0(i)
Pk;t
 
Yk;t; (2.18)
where Y dk;t0:t(i) is demand for the individual good in sector k produced by producer i at time t
conditional on keeping the price Pk;t0(i) xed at the level chosen at time t0; MC
k
t =
Wkt (i)
Akt
is the
nominal marginal cost in sector k at time t, and k are revenue taxes in sector k.
Given this setup, the price index in sector k evolves according to the following law of motion:
10We have to point out here that although the assumption of complete markets conveniently simplies the model, it
neglects a possibility of wealth e¤ects in response to di¤erent shocks (Benigno (2001)).
11Notice that wages are equalized between sectors inside each of the economies, due to perfect labour mobility and
perfect competition in the labour market.
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(Pk;t)
1  = k(Pk;t 1)1  + k(Pk;t0(i))
1 : (2.19)
2.3 Fiscal and monetary policies
The government in the domestic economy is occupied with collecting revenue taxes from rms that
are later redistributed to households in the form of lump-sum transfers in such a way that each period,
there is a balanced budget:
nZ
0
(NPN;t(i)YN;t(i) + HPH;t(i)YH;t(i)) di =
nZ
0
TRjtdj: (2.20)
A role for the monetary policy arises due to existing nominal and real rigidities in the economy:
price stickiness (together with monopolistic competition), home bias and the nontraded good sector,
which lead to deviations from PPP. The system is therefore closed by dening appropriate monetary
rule for the domestic economy.
2.4 A loglinearized version of the model
This section presents a system of the equilibrium conditions for the small open economy in the loglinear
form, which is derived through the rst-order approximation around the deterministic steady state
with zero ination dened in Appendix B. Here, we characterize the dynamic features of this model
where the variables with a hat stand for the log deviations from the steady state. Additionally, the
variables with an asterisk represent the foreign equivalents of the domestic variables.
The supply-side of the economy is given by two Phillips curves, one for the nontraded and one for
the domestic traded sector, respectively, which are derived from (2.18):
bN;t = kN ( bCt + bLt   bAN;t    bBt   bpN;t) + bN;t+1; (2.21)
bH;t = kH( bCt + bLt   bAH;t    bBt   bpH;t) + bH;t+1 (2.22)
where bN;t  ln( PN;tPN;t 1 ); bH;t  ln( PH;tPH;t 1 ); kN  (1 N )(1 N)N ; kH  (1 H)(1 H)H and aggregate
labour supply (bLt) is dened through the labour market clearing condition ((2.11), (2.17)):
bLt = edYN (bYN;t   bAN;t) + edYH (bYH;t   bAH;t); (2.23)
where edYN  Y NY N+Y H ; edYH  Y HY N+Y H are ratios evaluated in the steady state (see Appendix B).
It is worth underlining that ination dynamics in both domestic sectors do not only depend on the
real marginal costs in a given sector, but also on the relative prices of goods. In particular, a higher
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relative price of goods in one sector in relation to other goods induces a substitution away e¤ect and
leads to deationary pressures in this sector.
The demand side of the small open economy is represented by the market clearing conditions in
both nontraded and domestic traded sectors ((2.8), (2.9)):
bYN;t = bCt   bpN;t; (2.24)
bYH;t = dCH bCt   bpH;t + b(  )dCH bT dt + (1  dCH)cRSt+
+ (1  dCH) bCt + b(  )(1  dCH) bT dt (2.25)
where dCH  (1   )(1   ) CYH p
 
H p
 
T ; b  (pN )1 ; b  (pN )1  are ratios evaluated in the
steady state (see Appendix B). Additionally, we dene aggregate output as the sum of sector outputs:
bYt = dY N (bpN;t + bYN;t) + dY H(bpH;t + bYH;t); (2.26)
where dY N  pNYNY and dY H 
pHYH
Y
are ratios evaluated in the steady state (see Appendix B):
The complete asset market assumption (2.15) gives us the following risk sharing condition:
bCt = bBt + 1

cRSt + bCt   bBt : (2.27)
From the denition of price indices ((2.5), (2.6)), we obtain the following relations between relative
prices, terms of trade, domestic terms of trade and real exchange rate:
(a  1)bpH;t = bcT dt + adRSt   badT dt ; (2.28)
bpN;t = (1  b)cT dt ; (2.29)
bpH;t =  bcT dt   a bTt; (2.30)
where a  

RSpF
pT
1 
is the ratio evaluated in the steady state (see Appendix B). We also derive
the laws of motion for the international terms of trade and the domestic terms of trade from their
denitions:
bTt = bF;t   bH;t + bTt 1; (2.31)
bT dt = bN;t   bT;t + bT dt 1; (2.32)
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where bT;t = (1 a)bH;t+abF;t and bF;t = bF;t+(bSt  bSt 1) with bT;t  ln( PT;tPT;t 1 ), bF;t  ln( PF;tPF;t 1 ),bF;t  ln( PF;tPF;t 1 ):
Finally, we present equations dening the Maastricht variables: the CPI ination rate (bt); the
nominal interest rate ( bRt) and the nominal exchange rate (bSt). First, the nominal interest rate can
be derived from the loglinearized version of the Euler condition (2.14):
bRt = ( bCt+1   bBt+1)  ( bCt   bBt) + bt+1; (2.33)
where bt  ln( PtPt 1 ): CPI aggregate ination is a weighted sum of the sector ination rates:
bt = bbN;t + (1  a)(1  b)bH;t + a(1  b)bF;t + a(1  b)(bSt   bSt 1): (2.34)
Notice that CPI aggregate ination does not only depend on the domestic sector ination rates,
but also on the foreign traded ination rate and changes in the nominal exchange rate. For example,
a nominal exchange rate depreciation puts an upward pressure on the CPI ination rate.
The nominal exchange rate can be derived from the denition of the real exchange rate:
bSt = bSt 1 + bt   bt + cRSt   cRSt 1: (2.35)
The law of motion of the nominal exchange rate depends on the real exchange rate uctuations and
di¤erences in the aggregate ination rates between the home and the foreign economy. Additionally,
by combining the international risk sharing condition (2.27) and Euler conditions for the domestic
and foreign economy (2.33), we obtain a relation between the nominal interest rate and the nominal
exchange rate:
bSt = bRt   bRt + bSt+1: (2.36)
This equation represents a version of the uncovered interest rate parity, which implies that changes
in the nominal exchange rate result from di¤erences between the domestic and foreign monetary
policy. Let us point out that although very intuitive, this equation does not constitute an independent
equilibrium condition.
The system is closed by specifying a monetary rule. In this paper, we derive the optimal monetary
policy rule which maximizes welfare of the society subject to the structural equations of the economy.
The optimal rule is specied as a rule where the monetary authority stabilizes the target variables in
order to minimize the welfare loss of society and provide the most e¢ cient allocation.12 Apart from
the optimal monetary derivation in this framework, we also consider the optimal monetary policy
which is additionally constrained by the Maastricht convergence criteria.
Summing up, the dynamics of the small open economy are summarized by the following variables,
12Giannoni and Woodford (2003) call these type of rules exible ination targeting rules.
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bN;t; bH;t; bCt; bLt; bYH;t; bYN;t; bpN;t; bpH;t; bYt; cRSt; bT dt ; bTt; bSt; bt; bRt which are determined by equations
(2.21)(2.35), given the evolution of the stochastic shocks bAN;t; bAH;t; bBt and the foreign variables bCt ;bT dt ; bt ; bF;t:13
3 The optimal monetary policy
This section characterizes the optimal monetary policy, i.e. the policy maximizing welfare of society
subject to the structural equations of an economy. The micro foundations of our model give us a
natural welfare measure, i.e. a discounted sum of expected utilities for the agents in the economy (see
equation (2.1)).
We use a linear quadratic approach (Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999)) and dene the optimal
monetary policy problem as a minimization problem of the quadratic loss function subject to the
loglinearized structural equations (presented in the previous section). First, we present the welfare
measure derived through a second-order Taylor approximation of equation (2.1):
Wt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [z0vbvt   12bv0tZvbvt   bv0tZbt] + tip+O(3); (3.1)
where bv0t = h bCt bYN;t bYH;t bN;t bH;t i ; b0t = h bAN;t bAH;t bBt bCt i ;
z0v =
h
1  sC edYN  sC edYH 0 0 i and matrices Zv; Z are dened in Appendix B; tip
stands for terms independent of policy and O(3) includes terms that are of a higher order than the
second in the deviations of variables from their steady state values.
Notice that the welfare measure (3.1) contains the linear terms in aggregate consumption and
sector outputs. These linear terms result from the distortions in the economy. First, monopolistic
competition in both domestic sectors leads to ine¢ cient levels of sector outputs and subsequently, an
ine¢ cient level of aggregate output. Second, since the domestic economy is open, domestic consump-
tion and aggregate output are not equalized. Importantly, their composition depends on the domestic
and international terms of trade. Third, there exists a(n) (international) terms of trade externality
(see Corsetti and Pesenti (2001)) according to which monetary policy has an incentive to generate a
welfare improving real exchange rate appreciation which leads to a lower disutility from labour without
a corresponding decline in the utility of consumption.
The presence of linear terms in the welfare measure (3.1) means that we cannot determine the
optimal monetary policy, even up to rst order, using the welfare measure subject to the structural
equations (2.21)(2.35) that are only accurate to rst order. Following the method proposed by Be-
nigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno and Benigno (2005), we substitute the linear terms in the
13For simplicity, we choose to consider only one type of external shocks, foreign consumption shocks ( bCt ). As a
result, bT dt ; bt ; bF;t are assumed to be zero. Moreover, all shocks follow an AR(1) process with normally distributed
innovations.
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approximated welfare function (3.1) by second moments of aggregate output, domestic and interna-
tional terms of trade using a second-order approximation to the structural equations of the economy.14
As a result, we obtain the fully quadratic loss function which can be represented as a function of ag-
gregate output (bYt), domestic and international terms of trade (bT dt ; bTt) and domestic sector ination
rates (bH;t; bN;t). Its general expression is given below:
Lt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
Y (bYt   bY Tt )2 + 12Td( bT dt   bT dTt )2+
1
2
T ( bTt   bTTt )2 +TTd bT dt bTt +Y Td bYt bT dt +Y T bYt bTt+
+
1
2
Hb2H;t + 12N b2N;t] + tip+O(3); (3.2)
where bY Tt ; bT dTt ; bTTt are target variables which are functions of the stochastic shocks and, in general,
are di¤erent from the exible price equilibrium processes of aggregate output, domestic terms of trade
and international terms of trade.15 The coe¢ cients Y ; Td ; T ; TTd ; Y Td ; Y T ; H ; N are
functions of the structural parameters of the model. The term tip stands for terms independent of
policy.
Our loss function can be seen as a generalization of the previous studies encompassing both the
closed (Aoki (2001), Benigno (2004), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)) and open economy frameworks
(Gali and Monacelli (2005), de Paoli (2004)).16 Notice that if we set the size of the nontraded sector
to zero and therefore obtain a one-sector small open economy, the loss function becomes identical
to the loss function derived by de Paoli (2004).17 In this case, the loss function is a function of the
variances of aggregate output, terms of trade18 and home traded ination. On the other hand, if
we set the degree of openness to zero, we obtain the case of a two-sector closed economy which was
studied by Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004). Here, the loss function is a function of the variances of
aggregate output, domestic terms of trade, the covariance term between the two and variances of the
sector ination rates. Additionally, our loss function is closely related to the loss function derived for a
national policymaker in a two-country model with two sectors of Liu and Pappa (2005). Interestingly,
14Details of the derivation can be found in Appendix B.
15As previously shown in papers by Gali and Monacelli (2005) and de Paoli (2004), in the small open economy
framework the target variables will be identical to the exible price allocations only in some special cases, i.e. an
e¢ cient steady state, no markup shocks, no expenditure switching e¤ect (i.e.  = 1) and no trade imbalances.
16Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) present a one-sector closed economy model. Aoki (2001) presents a two-sector
closed economy model with sticky prices only in one of the sectors. Benigno (2004) analyses the case of a monetary
union comprised of two countries, which can be interpreted as a two-sector closed economy with totally segmented
labour markets (interpretation as in Woodford (2003)). Gali and Monacelli (2005) and de Paoli (2004) study the case
of a one-sector small open economy.
17 In our representation, there is a covariance term between terms of trade and aggregate output which can be
represented as the weighted sum of the variances of aggregate output and terms of trade.
18 In the analysis of de Paoli (2004), it is actually the variance of the real exchange rate. However, it must be kept in
mind that in a one-sector small open economy model, terms of trade and real exchange rate are proportional.
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since their model is absent from the monopolistic competition distortion, trade imbalances and also
expenditure switching e¤ect, the loss function of a national policymaker depends only on the sector
ination rates and the sector output uctuations around the exible price targets.
We characterize the optimal plan under commitment where the policy maker chooses the set of
variables
fbN;t; bH;t; bCt; bLt; bYH;t; bYN;t; bpN;t; bpH;t; bYt; cRSt; bT dt ; bTt; bSt; bt; bRtg1t=t0 in order to minimize the loss
function (3.2) subject to constraints (2.21)(2.35), given the initial conditions on this set of variables.19
To simplify the exposition of the optimal plan, we reduce the number of variables to the set of ve
domestic variables which determine the loss function (3.2), i.e. bYt; bT dt ; bTt; bN;t; bH;t. Therefore,
we represent the structural equations of the two-sector small open economy (2.21)(2.35) in terms of
these variables. The coe¢ cients are dened in Appendix B.
The supply side of the economy is represented by two Phillips curves which are derived from
equations (2.21) and (2.22) through a substitution of aggregate consumption, aggregate labour and
relative prices:
bN;t = kN (mN;Y bYt +mN;Td bT dt +mN;T bTt +mN;AN bAN;t+
+mN;AH
bAH;t +mN;B bBt) + bN;t+1; (3.3)
bH;t = kH(mH;Y bYt +mH;Td bT dt +mH;T bTt +mH;AN bAN;t+
+mH;AH
bAH;t +mH;B bBt) + bH;t+1: (3.4)
The equation describing the demand side of the economy is derived from the market clearing
conditions ((2.24), (2.25)) and the risk sharing condition (2.27):
bCt = bYt + nTd bT dt + nT bTt + nB bBt; (3.5)
where aggregate consumption, relative prices and real exchange rate were substituted out.
The last structural equation represents the law of motion of the domestic and international terms
of trade:
bT dt   bT dt 1 = bN;t   bH;t   a( bTt   bTt 1): (3.6)
Finally, the policy maker following the optimal plan under commitment chooses fbYt; bT dt ; bTt; bH;t; bN;tg1t=t0
in order to minimize the loss function (3.2) subject to the constraints (3.3)(3.6), given the initial
19The initial conditions guarantee the timeless perspective of the problem and make the rst-order conditions of the
problem time invariant (see Woodford (2003)).
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conditions on bYt0 ; bT dt0 ; bTt0 ; bH;t0 ; bN;t0 . The rst-order conditions of the problem are the following
(where i;t with i = 1; 2; 3; 4 are accordingly the Lagrange multipliers with respect to (3.3)(3.6)):
 with respect to bN;t :
N bN;t + 1;t   1;t 1   4;t = 0; (3.7)
 with respect to bH;t :
HbH;t + 2;t   2;t 1 + 4;t = 0; (3.8)
 with respect to bYt :
Y (bYt   bY Tt ) + Y Td bT dt +Y T bTt   kNmN;Y 1;t   kHmH;Y 2;t   3;t = 0; (3.9)
 with respect to bT dt :
Td( bT dt   bT dTt ) + TTd bTt +Y Td bYt   kNmN;Td1;t   kHmH;Td2;t 
+ nTd3;t + 4;t   4;t+1 = 0; (3.10)
 with respect to bTt :
T ( bTt   bTTt ) + TTd bT dt +Y T bYt   kNmN;T 1;t   kHmH;T 2;t 
+ nT 3;t + a4;t   a4;t+1 = 0: (3.11)
Equations (3.7)(3.11) and constraints (3.3)(3.6) fully characterize the behaviour of the economy
under the optimal monetary policy.
4 The Maastricht convergence criteria a reinterpretation
Including the Maastricht criteria in their original form as additional constraints of the optimal mon-
etary policy requires computationally demanding techniques. In particular, it results in solving the
minimization problem of the loss function (3.2) subject to additional nonlinear constraints. On the
other hand, the linear quadratic approach has two important advantages that make us decide to re-
formulate the criteria. First, it provides us with the analytical and intuitive expression for the loss
function which can also serve as a welfare measure to rank alternative suboptimal policies. Second,
the linear quadratic approach makes it easy to check second-order conditions (which would otherwise
be quite di¢ cult) for local optimality of the derived policy.
Therefore, the purpose of this section is to describe the way in which we reformulate the Maastricht
criteria in order to implement them as additional constraints faced by the monetary policy in our linear
quadratic framework.
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First, we summarize the criteria (described in the introduction) by the following inequalities:
 CPI aggregate ination criterion
At   A;t  B; (4.1)
where B = 1:5%; At is annual CPI aggregate ination in the domestic economy, 
A;
t is the
average of the annual CPI aggregate inations in the three lowest ination countries of the
European Union.
 nominal interest rate criterion
RLt  RL;At  CR (4.2)
where CR = 2%; RLt is the annul interest rate for ten-year government bond in the domestic
economy, RL;At is the average of the annual interest rates for ten-year government bonds in the
three countries of the European Union with the lowest ination rates.
 nominal exchange rate criterion
(1 DS)S  St  (1 +DS)S; (4.3)
where DS = 15% and S is the central parity between euro and the domestic currency and St is
the nominal exchange rate.
In order to adjust the criteria to the structure of the model, we assume that the variables A;t and
RL;At , respectively, represent foreign aggregate ination and the foreign nominal interest rate, i.e. bt ;bRt (which are proxied to be the euro area variables). Here, we implicitly assume that the aggregate
ination rate and the nominal interest rate of the euro area do not di¤er to any great extent from the
average of the three lowest ination countries of the European Union.20
Second, we impose some simplifying assumptions regarding the criteria to adjust them to the
quarterly nature of the model. The CPI ination rate criterion is stated in annual terms. We decide to
reformulate this criterion into the criterion on the quarterly CPI ination rate with an appropriately
changed upper bound, i.e. B  ((1:015)0:25   1): Notice that the criterion on the quarterly CPI
ination rate is stricter than the criterion set on the annual CPI ination rate.21 As far as the
nominal interest rate criterion is concerned, we also decide to reformulate it into the criterion on the
quarterly nominal interest rate. So, our reformulated criterion with the adjusted upper bound, i.e.
CR  ((1:02)0:25   1); is stricter than the original criterion.22 Still, to keep the exposition of both
criteria simple, we decide to use the reformulated criteria.
20We are aware of the CPI ination rate dispersion among the EMU member countries. Still the framework of the
model does not allow us to consider the criteria strictly in their original form.
21This means that it is possible that the original criterion can be still satised, even though the quarterly CPI ination
rate violates the reformulated criterion. On the other hand, if the quarterly CPI ination satises the criterion, the
original criterion is also satised.
22 If we assume that the expectations hypothesis holds, an upper bound restriction on the quarterly nominal interest
rate implies an upper bound criterion on the ten-year government bond yield. However, the reverse is not true.
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Moreover, the nominal exchange rate criterion is stated in terms of the quarterly nominal exchange
rate movements. Additionally, we dene the central parity of the nominal exchange rate as the steady
state value of the nominal exchange rate (S = S).
In order to implement the already adjusted criteria into the linear quadratic framework, we take
advantage of the method proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) and Woodford (2003)
which is applied to the zero bound constraint for the nominal interest rate. The authors propose to
approximate the zero bound constraint for the nominal interest rate by restricting the mean of the
nominal interest rate to be at least k standard deviations higher than the theoretical lower bound,
where k is a su¢ ciently large number to prevent frequent violation of the original constraint. The main
advantage of this alternative constraint over the original one is that it is much less computationally
demanding and it only requires computation of the rst and second moments of the nominal interest
rate, while the original one would require checking whether the nominal interest rate is negative in
any state which, in turn, depends on the distribution of the underlying shocks.
Importantly, to further simplify the exposition of the criteria, we assume that the foreign economy
is in the steady state, so that foreign CPI ination and the nominal interest rate (bt ; bRt ) are zero.
We are aware that if we relax this assumption and allow for a departure from the steady state of the
foreign economy and possibly also a suboptimal foreign monetary policy, the nature of the optimal
policy constrained by the Maastricht criteria and the associated welfare loss will be di¤erent than in
our benchmark case.23
Similarly to Woodford (2003), we redene the criteria using discounted averages in order to con-
form with the welfare measure used in our framework. Below, we show the reformulated Maastricht
convergence criteria.24 Each criterion is presented as a set of two inequalities:
 CPI aggregate ination criterion:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(B   bt)  0; (4.4)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(B   bt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t(B   bt)!2 ; (4.5)
 nominal interest rate criterion:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(CR   bRt)  0 (4.6)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(CR   bRt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t(CR   bRt)!2 (4.7)
23We discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption in more detail in Section 6.
24The detailed derivation of the Maastricht convergence criteria can be found in Appendix B.
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 nominal exchange rate criterion must be decomposed into two systems of the inequalities, i.e.
the upper bound and the lower bound:
 upper bound
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(DS   bSt)  0 (4.8)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(DS   bSt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t(DS   bSt)!2 (4.9)
 lower bound
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(DS + bSt)  0 (4.10)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(DS + bSt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t(DS + bSt)!2 (4.11)
where K = 1 + k 2 and DS = 15%; B = (1:015)0:25   1; CR = (1:02)0:25   1; k = 1:96:
The rst inequality means that the average values of the CPI ination rate, the nominal interest
rate and the nominal exchange rate, respectively, should not exceed the bounds, B; CR and DS : The
second inequality further restrains uctuations in the Maastricht variables by setting an upper bound
on their variances. This upper bound depends on the average values of the Maastricht variables and
the bounds, B; CR and DS . Importantly, it also depends on parameter K which guarantees that
the original constraints on the Maastricht variables ((4.1)(4.3)) are satised with a high probability.
Under a normality assumption, by setting K = 1 + 1:96 2, we obtain that fulllment of inequalities
(4.4)(4.11) guarantees that each of the original constraints should be met with a probability of 95%.
Summing up, the set of inequalities (4.4)(4.11) represent the Maastricht convergence criteria in
our model.
5 Optimal monetary policy constrained by the Maastricht cri-
teria
This section presents how to construct the loss function of the optimal monetary policy constrained
by the Maastricht convergence criteria summarized by inequalities (4.4)(4.11) (constrained optimal
policy). In this respect, we follow Woodford (2003). Specically, the loss function of the constrained
optimal monetary policy is augmented by the new elements which describe uctuations in CPI aggre-
gate ination, the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate.
We state the following proposition, which is based on Proposition 6.9 (p. 428) in Woodford (2003):
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Proposition 1 Consider the problem of minimizing an expected discounted sum of quadratic losses:
Et0
(
(1  )
1X
t=t0
tLt
)
; (5.1)
subject to (4.4) - (4.11). Let m1;; m1;R; mU1;S ; m
L
1;S be the discounted average values of (B   bt);
(CR   bRt); (DS   bSt); (DS + bSt) and mU2;S ; mL2;S ; m2;; m2;R be the discounted means of (B   bt)2;
(CR   bRt)2; (DS   bSt)2; (DS + bSt)2 associated with the optimal policy. Then, the optimal policy also
minimizes a modied discounted loss criterion of the form (5.1) with Lt replaced by:
eLt  Lt +(T   bt)2 +R(RT   bRt)2 +S;U (ST;U   bSt)2 +S;L(ST;L   bSt)2; (5.2)
under constraints represented by the structural equations of an economy. Importantly,   0; R 
0;S;U  0; S;L  0 and take strictly positive values if and only if the respective constraints (4.5),
(4.7), (4.9), (4.11) are binding. Moreover, if the constraints are binding, the corresponding target
values T ; RT ; ST;U ; ST;L satisfy the following relations:
T = B  Km1; < 0 (5.3)
RT = CR  Km1;R < 0 (5.4)
ST;U = DS  Km1;S < 0 (5.5)
ST;L =  DS +Km1;S > 0: (5.6)
Proof can be found in Appendix B.
In the presence of binding constraints, the optimal monetary policy constrained by the Maastricht
convergence criteria do not only lead to smaller variances of the Maastricht variables, it also assigns
target values for these variables that are di¤erent from the steady state of the optimal monetary
policy.
In particular, if the constraints on the nominal interest rate or CPI ination are binding, the
target values for these variables are negative. This means that the constrained optimal monetary
policy should target the CPI ination rate or the nominal interest rate that is actually lower than the
foreign CPI ination or the foreign nominal interest rate, respectively. Therefore, this policy results
in a deationary bias. Finally, the deationary bias together with a decrease in the nominal interest
rate lead to a nominal exchange rate appreciation. Notice that if the upper bound criterion on the
nominal exchange rate is binding, the constrained optimal policy is also characterized by a nominal
exchange rate appreciation and negative averages of the nominal interest rate and the CPI ination
rate.
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6 Numerical exercise
The purpose of this section is twofold, to characterize the optimal monetary policy for the EMU
accession countries, given their obligation to satisfy the Maastricht convergence criteria and analyze
whether and how it di¤ers from the optimal monetary policy not constrained by the criteria (the
unconstrained optimal monetary policy). To this end, in the rst step, we present the optimal mon-
etary policy and identify whether such a policy violates any of the Maastricht convergence criteria.
Second, based on the results, we construct the optimal policy that satises all the criteria (the con-
strained optimal monetary policy). Third, we compare both policies by studying their welfare costs
and analyzing their response pattern to the shocks.
6.1 Parameterization
Following the previous literature on the EMU accession countries (i.e. Laxton and Pesenti (2003),
Natalucci and Ravenna (2003)) we decide to calibrate the model to match the moments of the variables
for the Czech Republic economy.
The discount factor, , equals 0.99, which implies an annual interest rate of around four percent.
The coe¢ cient of risk aversion in consumer preferences is set to 2 as in Stockman and Tesar (1995)
to get an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 0.5. As far as labour supply elasticity ( 1 )
is concerned, the micro data estimates of  consider [3; 20] as a reasonable range. We decide to set 
to 4. The elasticity of substitution between nontradable and tradable consumption, , is set to 0.5 as
in Stockman and Tesar (1994) and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable
consumption, , is set to 1.5 (as in Chari et al. (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2004)). The elasticity
of substitution between di¤erentiated goods, , is equal to 10, which together with the revenue tax of
0.125 implies a markup of 1.23.26
The share of nontradable consumption in the aggregate consumption basket, , is assumed to
be 0.42, while the share of foreign tradable consumption in the tradable consumption basket, , is
assumed to be 0.4. These values correspond to the weights in CPI reported for the Czech Republic over
the period 20002005.27 As far as the foreign economy is concerned, we set the share of nontradable
consumption in the foreign aggregate consumption basket, , to be 0.6, which is consistent with the
value chosen by Benigno and Thoenisen (2003) regarding the structure of euro area consumption.
Following Natalucci and Ravenna (2003), we set the degree of price rigidity in the nontraded sector,
N , to 0.85. The degree of price rigidity in the traded sector, H , is slightly smaller and equals 0.8.
These values are somewhat higher than the values reported in the micro and macro studies for the euro
25This value represents the average share of Taxes less Subsidies in the Gross Domestic Product at 1995 constant
prices in the Czech Republic for the years 1995-2006 (source: Eurostat).
26Martins et al. (1996) estimate the average markup for manufacturing sectors at around 1.2 in most OECD countries
over the period 1980-1992. Some studies (Morrison (1994), Domowitz et al (1988)) suggest that the plausible estimates
range between 1.2 and 1.7.
27Source: Eurostat.
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area countries.28 Still, Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) justify them by a high share of the government
regulated prices in the EMU accession countries.
All shocks that constitute the stochastic environment of the small open economy follow the AR(1)
process. The parameters of the shocks are chosen to match the historical moments of the variables
(see Table B.3 in Appendix B). Similarly to Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) and Laxton and Pesenti
(2003), the productivity shocks in both domestic sectors are characterized by a strong persistence
parameter equal to 0.85. Standard deviations of the productivity shocks are set to 1.6% (nontraded
sector) and 1.8% (traded sector). These values roughly reect the values chosen by Natalucci and
Ravenna (2003), 1.8% (nontraded sector) and 2% (traded sector). Moreover, the productivity shocks
are strongly correlated, their correlation coe¢ cient is set to 0.7.29 All other shocks are independent
of each other. Parameters dening the preference shock are, 0.72% (standard deviation) and 0.95
(persistence parameter). These values are similar to the values chosen by Laxton and Pesenti (2003),
0.4% (standard deviation) and 0.7 (persistence parameter). Parameters of the foreign consumption
shock are estimated using quarterly data on aggregate consumption in the euro area over the period
1990-2005 (source: Eurostat). The standard deviation of the foreign consumption shock is equal to
0.23% and its persistence parameter is 0.85.
Following Natalucci and Ravenna (2003), we parametrize the monetary policy rule, i.e. the nominal
interest rate follows the rule described by: bRt = 0:9 bRt 1+0:1(bt+0:2bYt+0:3bSt)+b"R;t; where b"R;t is
the monetary policy innovation with a standard deviation equal to 0.45%. Such a parametrization of
the monetary policy rule enables us to closely match the historical moments of the Czech economy.
We summarize all parameters described above in Table B.1 (Structural parameters) and Table B.2
(Stochastic environment) in Appendix B. Moreover Table 3 (Matching the moments) in Appendix B
compares the model moments with the historical moments for the Czech Republic economy.
6.2 Unconstrained optimal monetary policy
Now, we characterize the optimal monetary policy under the chosen parameterization. First, we
analyze what the main concern of the optimal monetary policy is by studying the coe¢ cients of the
loss function given by (3.2).30 In Table 1, we present these coe¢ cients.
28Stahl (2004) estimates that the average duration between price adjustment in the manufacturing sector is nine
months (which corresponds to the degree of price rigidity: 0.67). On the other hand, Gali et al (2001) and Benigno and
Lopez-Salido (2003) estimate the aggregate supply relations for the European countries and nd the overall degree of
price rigidity for these countries to be 0.78.
29Empirical evidence shows that productivity shocks are highly persistent and positively correlated (see Backus et al
(1992)).
30Following Benigno and Woodford (2005), we check whether the second-order conditions of the policy problem are
satised in order to guarantee that there is no alternative random policy that could improve the welfare of society. This
consists in checking whether all eigenvalues of the matrix representing the loss function (3.2) are nonnegative.
22
Table 1: Values of the loss function coe¢ cients
N H Y Td T TTd Y Td Y T
117.81 28.62 3.51 0.11 0.11 -0.05 -0.31 -0.28
The highest penalty coe¢ cient is assigned to uctuations in nontradable sector ination and home
tradable ination. Therefore, the optimal monetary policy mainly stabilizes domestic ination. This
nding is in line with the literature on core ination targeting (Aoki (2001)). Apart from that, the
optimal monetary policy faces a trade o¤ between stabilizing the output gap and the sector inations
which is reected in the positive values of the penalty coe¢ cients assigned to uctuations in domestic
and international terms of trade.
Next, we check whether the optimal monetary policy satises the Maastricht convergence criteria.
Since the means of all variables under the optimal monetary policy are zero, we can reduce constraints
(4.4)(4.11) to the following set of inequalities:
dvar(bt)  (K   1)B2 (6.1)
dvar( bRt)  (K   1)C2R (6.2)
dvar(bSt)  (K   1)D2S ; (6.3)
wheredvar(xt) = Et0 1X
t=t0
tx2t and xt = bt; bRt; bSt: Notice that these constraints set the upper bounds
on the variances of the Maastricht variables. In Table 2, we present variances of these variables
under optimal monetary policy and the respective upper bounds that represent the right-hand side
of equations (6.1)(6.3). We write that a criterion is violated (satised) when the variance of the
respective Maastricht variable is higher (smaller) than the upper bound.
Table 2: Moments of the Maastricht variables under optimal monetary policy
CPI ination nominal interest rate nominal exchange rate
variance (in (%)2) 0.2638 0.3525 16.6195
mean (in%) 0 0 0
bound (in (%)2) 0.0356 0.0651 58.57
criterion violated violated satisfied
The optimal monetary policy violates two of the Maastricht convergence criteria, the CPI ination
criterion and the nominal interest rate criterion. The nominal exchange rate criterion is satised.31
Therefore, the loss function of optimal monetary policy for the EMU accession countries must be
augmented by additional terms.
31Note that currently, the Czech Republic economy satises the Maastricht criteria regarding CPI ination, the
nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate. See Figures 3 (the CPI ination criterion), 5 (the nominal interest
rate criterion) and 6 (the nominal exchange criterion) in Appendix A.
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6.3 Constrained optimal policy
Now, we construct the optimal monetary policy that satises all Maastricht criteria. First, we augment
the loss function of the optimal monetary policy with additional terms reecting uctuations of CPI
ination and the nominal interest rate and solve the new policy problem.32 Second, we check whether
such a policy also satises the nominal exchange rate criterion.
The loss function of the optimal policy that satises two additional constraints on CPI ination
and the nominal interest rate is given below:
eLt = Lt + 1
2
(
T   bt)2 + 1
2
R(R
T   bRt)2; (6.4)
where  > 0; R > 0 and T < 0; RT < 0: Values of the penalty coe¢ cients (; R) and targets
(T ; RT ) can be obtained from the solution to the minimization problem of the original loss function
constrained by structural equations (3.3)(3.6) and also the additional constraints on the CPI ination
rate (4.4)(4.5) and the nominal interest rate (4.6)(4.7).33 These values are presented in Table 3:
Table 3: Values of the additional parameters in the augmented loss function
 R 
T (in %) RT (in %)
42.65 23.87 -0.1779 -0.1877
Notice that values of the penalty coe¢ cients on the CPI ination rate and nominal interest rate
uctuations are of the same magnitude as the penalty coe¢ cients on the domestic ination rates. The
negative target value for the CPI ination rate means that now, monetary policy targets the CPI
ination rate and the nominal interest rate that in annual terms are 0.7% smaller than their foreign
counterparts.
Finally, we check whether this policy also satises the nominal exchange rate criterion. In Table 4,
we present the rst and second discounted moments of all Maastricht variables and evaluate whether
each of the criteria is satised. A criterion is satised when the respective set of inequalities that
describes this criterion holds. In particular, the CPI ination criterion is described by the set of
inequalities (4.4)(4.5), the nominal interest criterion is explained by (4.6)(4.7) and the nominal
exchange rate criterion by (4.8)(4.11).
Table 4: Moments of the Maastricht variables under the constrained optimal policy
CPI ination nominal interest rate nominal exchange rate
variance (in (%)2) 0.0475 0.0809 14.6207
mean (in%) -0.0572 -0.0576 -5.7226
criterion satisfied satisfied satisfied
32First-order conditions of this policy are presented in Appendix B.
33Special thanks to Michael Woodford for explaining the algorithm to nd the parameters of the constrained policy
problem (see p. 427435 in Woodford (2003)).
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Importantly, the nominal exchange rate criterion is satised. Not surprisingly, variances of the
CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate are smaller than under the optimal policy. Notice
that the variance of the nominal exchange rate is smaller than the one under the optimal monetary
policy. This is due to the fact that the nominal exchange rate changes are, apart from the domestic
sector ination rates, one of the components of the CPI ination rate (see (2.34)). So the policy that
targets domestic ination rates and the CPI aggregate ination rate at the same time also decreases
the nominal exchange rate variability. Let us remark that the negative targets for the nominal interest
rate and the CPI aggregate ination lead to negative means of all Maastricht variables. Therefore, a
central bank choosing such a policy commits itself to a policy resulting in the average CPI ination
rate and the nominal interest rate being 0.2% smaller in annual terms than their foreign counterparts.
Additionally, this policy is characterized by an average nominal exchange rate appreciation of nearly
6%.
Summing up, the optimal monetary policy constrained by additional criteria on the CPI ination
and the nominal interest rate is the policy satisfying all Maastricht convergence criteria.
6.4 Comparison of the constrained and unconstrained optimal policy
Now, we focus on the comparison of the optimal monetary policy and the optimal policy constrained
by the convergence criteria. First, we calculate the welfare losses associated with each policy and
second, we analyze di¤erences between the policies in their stabilization pattern when responding to
the shocks.
In Table 5, we present the expected discounted welfare losses for both policies:
Table 5: Welfare losses for the unconstrained and constrained optimal policy
UOP COP
loss (in (%)2) 7.1533 9.2956
where UOP is the unconstrained optimal policy and COP is the constrained optimal monetary
policy.
The obligation to comply with the Maastricht convergence criteria induces additional welfare costs
equal to 30% of the optimal monetary policy loss. These welfare costs are mainly explained by the
deterministic component of the constrained policy. Although the constrained optimal policy reduces
variances of the Maastricht variables, it must also induce negative targets for the CPI ination rate
and the nominal interest rate to satisfy the criteria. These negative targets result in the negative
means of all variables.
The welfare loss associated with the constrained optimal policy crucially depends on the foreign
economy and the way its monetary policy is conducted. In our benchmark case, we assume the
foreign economy to be in the steady state. This helps us simplify the exposition of the constrained
optimal monetary policy problem. However, by allowing the foreign economy to be hit by stochastic
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shocks and, moreover, its monetary policy to be suboptimal, we obtain di¤erent targets and also
penalty coe¢ cients for domestic CPI ination and the nominal interest rate. It can be shown that
in such a situation, the targets on the CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate will not only
depend on the average values of their foreign counterparts, but also on their uctuations. However,
a deationary bias feature of the constrained policy is preserved.34 These di¤erent values of targets
and penalty coe¢ cients will alter the welfare loss associated with the constrained optimal monetary
policy. Importantly, the more volatile is the foreign economy (due to suboptimal policy or a volatile
stochastic environment of the foreign economy) the smaller is the welfare loss associated with the
constrained optimal policy.
Now, we investigate how the two policies, constrained optimal monetary policy and unconstrained
optimal monetary policy, di¤er when responding to the shocks. First, we analyze which shocks are
most important in creating uctuations of the Maastricht variables. In the table below, we present
variance decomposition results for CPI aggregate ination, the nominal interest rate and the nominal
exchange rate. Since the variance decomposition structure does not change to any considerable extent
with the chosen policy, we report results for the constrained policy.
Table 6: Variance decomposition of the Maastricht variables under the constrained policy
shocks:
variables: AN AH B C
CPI ination 80% 2% 11% 7%
nominal interest rate 86% 7% 4% 3%
nominal exchange rate 75% 3% 20% 2%
Around 80% of the total variability of CPI aggregate ination, the nominal interest rate and the
nominal exchange rate are explained by domestic nontradable productivity shocks. This result is
consistent with the literature on the sources of ination di¤erentials in the euro area (Altisssimo et
al (2004)). Notice that although parameters describing productivity shocks are similar in our setup,
each of the productivity shocks has a di¤erent impact on the real exchange rate and therefore, on
the Maastricht variables. This can easily be understood by analyzing the following equation, which
relates the real exchange rate to domestic and international terms of trade (see (2.28), (2.30)):
dRSt = bdT dt   bcT dt + (1  a) bTt: (6.5)
Both domestic productivity shocks result in real exchange rate depreciation. However, the magni-
tude of the real exchange rate depreciation di¤ers between the two shocks. Nontradable productivity
shocks lead to a decline in the domestic terms of trade and a rise in the international terms of trade.
Both changes have a depreciation e¤ect on the real exchange rate. On the other hand, domestic
tradable productivity shocks result in a rise of both types of terms of trade. From equation (6.5) we
34See Proposition 3 in Appendix B.
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see that increases in both types of terms of trade cancel out and lead to a small change in the real
exchange rate. As a result, domestic nontradable productivity shocks lead to a stronger real exchange
rate depreciation and therefore, larger changes in the nominal interest rate and the CPI ination rate.
Having all this in mind, we decide to study the stabilization pattern of both policies in response
to domestic nontradable productivity shocks.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of the Maastricht variables to a positive domestic nontradable
productivity shock
Under the unconstrained optimal policy, a positive domestic nontradable productivity shock leads
to a fall in the nominal interest rate. This decrease of the nominal interest partially stabilizes dea-
tionary pressures in the domestic nontraded sector and supports an increase in domestic aggregate
output and consumption (not shown here). Since the foreign nominal interest rate remains constant,
the uncovered interest rate parity induces a nominal exchange rate depreciation followed by an ex-
pected appreciation. The initial nominal exchange rate depreciation results in a strong initial increase
of CPI ination, which declines in subsequent periods, reverting to its mean.
The constrained policy is characterized by both CPI targeting and nominal interest rate targeting.
To reduce the initial CPI increase (observed under the unconstrained policy), such a policy induces a
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more muted response of the real exchange rate and a stronger fall in domestic nontraded prices. These
two e¤ects are achieved through a more contractionary policy, i.e. a higher nominal interest rate as
compared with the unconstrained optimal policy. Such behaviour of the nominal interest rate is in
line with the nominal interest rate targeting feature of the constrained optimal policy. As a result, an
initial increase of the CPI ination is smaller. Moreover, a higher domestic nominal interest rate leads
to a smaller depreciation of the nominal exchange rate through the uncovered interest rate parity.
Summing up, in response to domestic nontradable productivity shocks, the constrained optimal
policy leads to smaller uctuations in all three Maastricht variables than unconstrained optimal mon-
etary policy. However, it must be kept in mind that the constrained optimal policy commits to the
ination rate and the nominal interest rate that are lower than their foreign counterparts which results
in substantial welfare costs.
6.5 Robustness analysis
The characteristics of the unconstrained and constrained optimal policy critically depend on the
structural parameters of an economy and also the volatility of the stochastic environment. The purpose
of this section is to investigate how changes in values of the parameters describing the structure and
the stochastic environment of the small open economy a¤ect our main ndings.
As far as the structure of the small open economy is concerned, we identify two crucial parameters:
share of nontradables () and degree of openness (). We derive the unconstrained and constrained
optimal policy for di¤erent values of these parameters. Our ndings can be summarized as follows:
 for all possible combinations of (; ),35 the nominal exchange rate criterion is satised under
the unconstrained optimal policy,
 for all possible combinations of (; ), the nominal interest rate criterion is not satised under
the unconstrained optimal policy,
 the CPI ination rate criterion is satised under the unconstrained optimal policy for small
values of  and/or high values of , i.e. for economies that are relatively closed and have a high
share of nontradables (see Table B.4 in Appendix B),
 for small values of  and high values of , the constrained policy that satises the CPI ination
rate criterion and the nominal interest rate criterion fails to satisfy the nominal exchange rate
criterion (the lower bound constraint is not satised, i.e. the nominal exchange rate appreciates
too much, see Table B.5 in Appendix B).
Under our chosen parameterization of the stochastic environment, the productivity shocks are
characterized by the highest standard deviation. Not surprisingly, elimination of the preference and
35All combinations of (; ) for which the second-order conditions of the unconstrained policy problem are satised.
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foreign consumption shocks does not alter our results, i.e. the unconstrained optimal policy fails to
satisfy the CPI ination rate criterion and the nominal interest rate criterion and the optimal policy
constrained by these two criteria also satises the nominal exchange rate criterion. The results do not
change, even if we eliminate one of the productivity shocks, i.e. in the traded or nontraded sector.
Finally, the unconstrained optimal policy satises all Maastricht convergence criteria provided that
the standard deviations of the productivity shocks in both sectors are reduced by at least 80% of the
original values (see Table B.6 in Appendix B)
Summing up, both the structure and the stochastic environment of the small open economy a¤ect
the characteristics of the unconstrained and constrained optimal policy. In relatively closed economies
and/or with a high share of nontradables, there is a trade o¤between complying with the CPI ination
rate and the nominal interest rate criteria and the nominal exchange rate criterion. Moreover, volatility
of productivity shocks plays a crucial role in determining whether the unconstrained optimal monetary
policy is compatible with the Maastricht convergence criteria.
7 Conclusions
This paper characterizes the optimal monetary policy for the EMU accession countries, taking into
account their obligation to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. We perform our analysis in the
framework of a two-sector small open economy DSGE model.
First, we derive the micro founded loss function which represents the policy objective function of
the optimal monetary policy using the second-order approximation method (to the welfare function
and all structural equations of the economy). We nd that the optimal monetary policy should not
only target ination rates in the domestic sectors and aggregate output uctuations, but also domestic
and international terms of trade. The main intuition for this result consists of understanding the e¤ects
of distortions present in the economy: monopolistic competition that implies ine¢ cient sector outputs,
price stickiness in both sectors that leads to an ine¢ cient path of the domestic terms of trade and the
international terms of trade externality that can a¤ect the wedge between marginal disutility from
labour and utility of consumption. All these distortions lead to the introduction of new elements in
the loss function: domestic and international terms of trade.
Second, we reformulate the Maastricht convergence criteria taking advantage of the method de-
veloped by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) to address the zero bound nominal interest rate
problem. Subsequently, we show how the loss function of the monetary policy changes when the
monetary policy is subject to the Maastricht convergence criteria: the CPI ination rate criterion, the
nominal interest rate criterion and the nominal exchange rate criterion. The loss function of such a
constrained policy is characterized by additional elements that penalize uctuations of the CPI ina-
tion rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate around the new targets di¤erent
from the steady state of the optimal monetary policy.
Under the chosen parameterization (which roughly represents the Czech Republic), optimal mon-
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etary policy violates two Maastricht criteria, the CPI ination criterion and the nominal interest
rate criterion. The optimal policy that instead satises these two criteria also satises the nominal
exchange rate criterion. Both the deterministic component and the stabilization component of the
constrained policy are di¤erent from the unconstrained optimal policy. The constrained policy leads
to a lower variability of CPI ination, the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate. At
the same time, this policy targets the CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate that are 0.7%
lower (in annual terms) than their counterparts in the reference countries. This produces additional
welfare costs that amount to 30% of the optimal monetary policy loss.
The tools developed in this paper can be used to describe the optimal policy which faces additional
constraints that are exogenously decided and do not form part of the structural constraints of an
economy. Importantly, the Maastricht Treaty also sets restrictions on the debt and decit policy of
the EMU accession countries. Therefore, a natural extension of the analysis involves the introduction
of the scal policy by endogeneizing tax and debt decisions. Including all the restrictions faced by the
scal and monetary policies in the EMU accession countries would enable us to investigate the e¤ects
of these restrictions on the interaction between the two policies.
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A Data on the EMU accession countries
This section presents gures and data regarding the EMU accession countries. All the data were
collected from the Eurostat database and the European Commission webpage.
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Figure A.1: Total annual labour productivity growth in the EMU accession countries and the EU 15
(annual rates in %)
Table A.1: Structure of the EMU accession countries
countries share of nontradables in consumption share of imports in GDP#
Czech Republic 42% 68%
Estonia 39% 86%
Hungary 44% 71%
Latvia 37% 55%
Lithuania 33% 58%
Poland 37% 35%
Slovenia 49% 59%
Slovakia 41% 78%
average in the EU - 15 51% 63%
note:   average value for the period 2000 - 2005; #  average value for the period 2000 - 2007
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Figure A.2: CPI ination in the EMU accession countries and the EU - 15 in 2000 - 2005 (annual %
rates)
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Figure A.3: CPI ination rates in the EMU accession countries since their accession to the EU
(annual rates in %)
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Figure A.4: EMU convergence criterion bond yields for the EMU accession countries and the euro
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Figure A.5: EMU convergence criterion bond yields for the EMU accession countries since their
accession to the EU (annual rates in %)
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Figure A.6: Nominal exchange rate uctuations vs. euro of the EMU accession countries since the
accession to the EU (average monthly changes since the EU accession date)
B Characteristics of the model
B.1 Parameterization
We present values of the structural parameters and also values of the stochastic parameters chosen in
the numerical exercise.
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Table B.1: Structural parameters
The parameter denition value of the parameter
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  2
inverse of the labour supply elasticity  4
discount factor  0.99
intratemporal elasticity between variety of the goods  10
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables  1.5
elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables  0.5
share of nontradables  0.42
degree of openness  0.4
price rigidity in the nontradable sector N 0.85
price rigidity in the home tradable sector H 0.8
steady state share of taxes in the nontradable sector N 0.1
steady state share of taxes in the tradable sector H 0.1
share of nontradables in the foreign economy  0.6
Table B.2: Stochastic environment
shocks autoregressive parameter standard deviation (in %)
nontradable productivity (AN ) 0.85 1.6
tradable productivity (AH) 0.85 1.8
preference (B) 0.95 0.72
foreign consumption (C) 0.85 0.23
corr( bAN;t; bAH;t) = 0:7 where corr - correlation coe¢ cient
Note: The policy rule is calibrated following Natalucci and Ravenna (2003): bRt = 0:9 bRt 1 +
0:1(bt + 0:2bYt + 0:3bSt) + b"R;t; where SD(b"R;t) = 0:45:
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Table B.3: Matching the moments
Statistics My framework Natalucci and Ravenna (2003)
Standard deviation in % Model Historical Model Historical
Output: 1.87 1.68 1.53 1.74
nontraded sector 1.95 1.56 2.72 1.55
traded sector 3.23 4.32 2.87 2.25
Consumption 1.94 1.93 2.28 2.29
Nominal interest rate 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.47
Nominal exchange rate 2.84 2.59 2.79 3.04
Real exchange rate 2.35 3.62 2.48 2.75
CPI ination rate: 0.82 0.91 1.1 1.08
nontraded sector 0.59 0.97 0.79 2.61
traded sector 0.94 0.74 2.4 0.99
Note: For comparison purposes the table shows also the results of the paper by Natalucci and
Ravenna (2003). The model moments are theoretical.
As far as the historical statistics are concerned our data sample for the Czech Republic is 1995:1 -
2006:2 (Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) database is 1994:1 - 2003:1). CPI ination rate in the traded
and nontraded sector data sample is 2000:1 - 2006:2. All series are logged (except for interest and
ination rates) and Hodrick - Prescott ltered. Rates of change are quarterly.
All data were collected from the Eurostat webpage (the data in Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) were
collected from the OECD publication Statistical Compendium (2003) and the Czech Republic National
Accounts (July 2003)). Data are seasonally adjusted where appropriate. We present the detailed
data series. Output: Gross value added (GVA) at 1995 constant prices in national currency. Traded
output is an aggregate of sectoral GVA for: Agriculture; Hunting; Forestry and Fishing; Total industry
(excluding construction). Nontraded output is an aggregate of sectoral GVA for: Wholesale and retail
trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal household goods; Hotels and restaurants;
Transport, storage and communication; Financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business
activities. Consumption: Final consumption expenditure of households at 1995 constant prices in
national currency. Nominal interest rate: three months T - bill interest rate. Nominal exchange
rate: Bilateral Koruny/euro exchange rate (quarterly average). Real exchange rate: CPI based real
e¤ective exchange rate (6 trading partners, quarterly average). CPI ination rate: Harmonised Index
of Consumer Prices (HICP). CPI ination rate in the nontraded sector: HICP - Services. CPI ination
in the traded sector: HICP - Goods.
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B.2 Steady state characterization
We dene a deterministic steady state with zero ination rate. We present a small open economy as
the limiting case of a two country model, i.e. n = 0 and  = 1 : All variables in the steady state are
denoted with a bar. All the shocks take the constant values, in particular: AN = AH = 1; B = 1:36
Moreover discount factors are:
Qt0;t = Q

t0;t = 
t t0 (B.1)
First order conditions of the domestic rms are the following:
pN =
N
(N   1)(1  N )
W
N
P
; (B.2)
pH =
H
(H   1)(1  H)
W
H
P
(B.3)
where pN =
PN
P
; pH =
PH
P
:We dene markups in the domestic nontraded and home traded sector:
N =
N
(N 1)(1 N ) ; H =
H
(H 1)(1 H) :
Labour supply optimality conditions are presented below:
C
 W
N
P
=
 
L

; (B.4)
C
 W
H
P
=
 
L

: (B.5)
These two conditions imply that real wages are equalized in the domestic sectors:
W
N
P
=
W
H
P
= !: (B.6)
Moreover substituting rst order conditions of the rms ((B.2), (B.3)) into the labour supply
optimality conditions ((B.4), (B.5)) we obtain the following relation:37
pNN
 1 = pHH
 1: (B.7)
From the market clearing condition in the domestic labour market we know that:
L = LN + LH : (B.8)
36Foreign consumption is derived from the steady state relations of the foreign economy.
37Notice that if markups in the nontraded and home traded sector are equal, i.e. N = H then also the domestic
relative prices of nontraded and home traded goods are equal, i.e. pN = pH .
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Moreover from the production function we get that:
LN = YN ; (B.9)
LH = YH : (B.10)
Demands for domestic traded and nontraded goods are presented below:
Y N = CN = p
 
N C; (B.11)
Y H = CH + C

H = p
 
H p
 
T (1  )(1  )C + p H p F (1  )C

(B.12)
where pH =
PH
P
; pF =
PF
P
 :
We dene aggregate output in the following way:
Y = pNY N + pHY H : (B.13)
Notice that since the law of one price holds for the traded goods: pH = pHRS
 1
:
We dene the following steady state ratios for the home economy:
dCH = (1  )(1  ) C
Y H
p H p
 
T ; (B.14)
sC = !
L
C
=
pN
N
YN + YH
C
; (B.15)
dYN =
pNYN
Y
; (B.16)
dYH =
pHYH
Y
; (B.17)
edYN = YN
YN + YH
; (B.18)
edYH = YH
YN + YH
: (B.19)
From the complete asset market assumption and the assumption that the initial wealth distribution
is such that  = RS0

C0
C0

= 1 we obtain:
C = RS
1
C

: (B.20)
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Lastly from the denition of price indices and the assumption that the law of one price holds in
the traded sector we get the following relations between relative prices:
pT
1 pH 1 = (1  ) + (RSpH 1pF )1 ; (B.21)
1 = pN
1  + (1  )pT 1 : (B.22)
The set of the following conditions solves for the steady state values of domestic variables: pN ; pH ;
pT ; C; RS (C

and pF are treated as exogenous and are obtained from a similar set of the conditions
for the foreign economy):38
C = RS
1
C

; (B.26)
pNN
 1 = pHH
 1; (B.27)
C
 
pHH
 1 =

p N C + p
 
H p
 
T (1  )(1  )C + p H RS

p F (1  )C

; (B.28)
pT
1  = (1  )pH1  + (RSpF )1 ; (B.29)
1 = pN
1  + (1  )pT 1 : (B.30)
B.3 A loglinearized version of the model
We loglinearize the model around the above presented steady state. We present the structural equa-
tions that describe dynamics of the domestic economy. All the variables with hat represent the log
deviations from the steady state. The system is closed by specifying the monetary rules for each of
the economies.
38The set of optimality conditions for the foreign economy which determines the steady state values of C

; pF ; p

N is
the following:
C
  
pN
 1
N =

p N 
 + p F (1  )

(B.23)
p1 N + (1  )p1 F = 1 (B.24)
pN
 1
N = p

F
 1
F (B.25)
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bN;t = kN ( bCt + bLt   bAN;t    bBt   bpN;t) + bN;t+1; (B.31)
bH;t = kH( bCt + bLt   bAH;t    bBt   bpH;t) + bH;t+1; (B.32)
bLt = edYN (bYN;t   bAN;t) + edYH (bYH;t   bAH;t); (B.33)
bYN;t = bCt   bpN;t; (B.34)
bYH;t = dCH bCt   bpH;t + b(  )dCH bT dt + (1  dCH)cRSt+
+ (1  dCH) bCt + b(  )(1  dCH) bT dt ; (B.35)
bYt = dY N (bpN;t + bYN;t) + dY H(bpH;t + bYH;t) (B.36)
bCt = bBt + 1

cRSt + bCt   bBt ; (B.37)
(a  1)bpH;t = bcT dt + adRSt   badT dt ; (B.38)
bpN;t = (1  b)cT dt ; (B.39)
bpH;t =  bcT dt   a bTt; (B.40)
bTt =dSt   bH;t + bTt 1; (B.41)
bT dt = bN;t   bT;t + bT dt 1; (B.42)
bT;t = bH;t + a( bTt   bTt 1): (B.43)
The Maastricht variables can be derived from the following equations:
bSt =dSt   bSt 1; (B.44)
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bSt = bSt 1 + bt   bt + cRSt   cRSt 1; (B.45)
bRt = ( bCt+1   bBt+1)  ( bCt   bBt) + bt+1; (B.46)
bt = bbN;t + (1  a)(1  b)bH;t + a(1  b)(bSt   bSt 1): (B.47)
B.4 Quadratic representation of the optimal loss function
B.4.1 The second order approximation of the welfare function
We present a second order approximation to the welfare function (2.1):
Wt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [z0vbvt   12bv0tZvbvt   bv0tZbt] + tip+O(3) (B.48)
where bv0t = h bCt bYN;t bYH;t bN;t bH;t i ; b0t = h bAN;t bAH;t bBt bCt i ; tip stands for
terms independent of policy and O(3) includes terms that are of order higher than the second in the
deviations of variables from their steady state values. The matrices zv; Zv; Z are dened below:
z0v =
h
1  sC edYN  sC edYH 0 0 i ; (B.49)
Zv =
26666664
  1 0 0 0 0
0 sC edYN (1 +  edYN ) sC edYN edYH bY 0 0
0 sC edYN edYH bY sC edYH (1 +  edYH ) 0 0
0 0 0 sC edYN kN 0
0 0 0 0 sC edYH kH
37777775 ; (B.50)
Z =
26666664
0 0   0
 sC edYN (1 +  edYN )  sC edYH edYN 0 0
 sC edYH edYN  sC edYH (1 +  edYH ) 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
37777775 : (B.51)
B.4.2 Elimination of the linear terms
This section describes in detail how we eliminate the linear terms in the second order approximation
to the welfare function in order to obtain a quadratic loss function. Moreover we reduce the number
of structural variables that represent the policy problem by appropriate substitutions.
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The optimal monetary policy solves the welfare maximization problem with the constraints given
by the structural equations of the economy (their loglinearized versions are (B.31) - (B.43)). The
matrix representation of the second order approximation to the welfare function is the following:
W = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [z0xbxt   12bx0tZxbxt   bx0tZbt] + tip+O(3): (B.52)
Similarly we present a second order approximation to all the structural equations in the matrix
form:
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
266664
A1 bxt
A2 bxt
:::
A13 bxt
377775+ 12
266664
bxt0B1 bxtbxt0B2 bxt
:::bxt0B13 bxt
377775+
266664
bxt0C1 btbxt0C2 bt
:::bxt0C13 bt
377775] + tip+O(3) = 0 (B.53)
with
bx0t = h bYt bLt bCt bYN;t bYH;t bpN;t bpH;t cT dt bTt dRSt dSt dH;t dN;t dT;t i ; (B.54)
b0t  h bAN;t bAH;t bBt bCt i
where tip means terms independent of policy.
Following the methodology of Benigno and Woodford (2005) in order to eliminate the linear terms
in the welfare function we solve the system of linear equations:
A = z
0
x (B.55)
where A(1314) =
266664
A1
A2
:::
A13
377775;
(113) =
h
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
i
and zx(141):
As a result we obtain the loss function:
Lt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
bx0tLxbxt + bx0tLbt] + tip+O(3) (B.56)
where
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Lx = Zx + 1B1 + 2B2 + 4B4 + 6B6 + 9B9 + 10B10 + 11B11 + 12B12 + 13B13;(B.57)
L = Z + 1C1 + 2C2 + 4C4 + 6C6 + 13C13: (B.58)
B.4.3 Substitution of the variables
We want to represent the loss function (B.56) and also the whole model just in terms of the following
variables:
by0t = h bYt bT dt bTt bSt bH;t bN;t bT;t i : (B.59)
In order to do this we dene matrices Nx(145) and N(146) that map all the variables in the
vector y0t in the following way:
bxt = Nxby0t +N 0bt (B.60)
where:
Nx =
2666666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 ltd lt 0 0 0 0
1 ctd ct 0 0 0 0
1 yntd ynt 0 0 0 0
1 yhtd yht 0 0 0 0
0 pntd 0 0 0 0 0
0 phtd pht 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 rstd rst 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3777777777777777777777777777775
; (B.61)
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Nx =
2666666666666666666666666666664
0 0 0 0
lan lah lb 0
0 0 cb 0
0 0 ynb 0
0 0 yhb 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3777777777777777777777777777775
(B.62)
with parameters dened below:
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pntd = 1  b (B.63)
phtd =  b (B.64)
pht =  a (B.65)
rstd =  b (B.66)
rst = 1  a (B.67)
cb = (1  dCH)dY H (B.68)
ct = adY H(1  ) + dY H(1  dCH)(1

  )(1  a) (B.69)
ctd = dY N (1  b)(  1) + bdY H(1  ) + b(   )dCHdY H + (B.70)
+(1  dCH)(   1

)dY Hb (B.71)
yntd = ctd    (1  b) (B.72)
ynb = cb (B.73)
ynt = ct (B.74)
yhtd = dY Nb   dY NdCHb(   )  (1  dCH)(   1

)bdY N + (B.75)
 dY N + b+ dY N(1  b) (B.76)
yht = dY Na  dY N (1  dCH)(   1

)(a  1) + dY Ha (B.77)
yhb =  dyn(1  dCH) (B.78)
ltd = edY N  yntd+ edY H  yhtd (B.79)
lt = edY N  ynt+ edY H  yht (B.80)
lan =  edY N (B.81)
lab =  edY H (B.82)
lb = edY N  ynb+ edY H  yhb (B.83)
The loss function can be expressed now as:
Lt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
by0tLybyt + by0tL;ybt] + tip+O(3) (B.84)
where:
Ly = N
0
xLxNx; (B.85)
L;y = N
0
xLxN +N
0
xL: (B.86)
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Since variables [St; T;t] do not appear in the original welfare objective function and in the second
order terms of the structural equations we can further reduce the set of the variables which appear in
the loss function to:
by0t = h bYt bT dt bTt bH;t bN;t i (B.87)
The nal set of the structural equations which represent the constraints of the maximization
problem is:
bN;t = kNcmcN;rt + bN;t+1; (B.88)
bH;t = kHcmcH;rt + bH;t+1; (B.89)
bCt = bYt + (ctd  1rstd) bT dt + (ct  1rst) bTt + (cb  1) bBt; (B.90)
bT dt   bT dt 1 = bN;t   bH;t   a( bTt   bTt 1) (B.91)
where:
cmcN;rt = (+ )bYt + (  ctd+   ltd  pntd) bT dt + (B.92)
+(  ct+   lt) bTt   (1 +   edY N ) bAN;t + (B.93)
  edY H bAH;t + (  (cb  1) +   lb) bBt (B.94)cmcH;rt = (+ )bYt + (  ctd+   ltd  phtd) bT dt + (B.95)
+(  ct+   lt  pht) bTt    edY N bAN;t + (B.96)
 (1 +   edY H) bAH;t + (  (cb  1) +   lb) bBt (B.97)
with:
mN;Y = +  (B.98)
mN;Td =   ctd+   ltd  pntd (B.99)
mN;T =   ct+   lt (B.100)
mN;AN =  (1 +   edY N ) (B.101)
mN;AH =   edY H (B.102)
mN;B =   (cb  1) +   lb (B.103)
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mH;Y = +  (B.104)
mH;Td =   ctd+   ltd  phtd (B.105)
mH;T =   ct+   lt  pht (B.106)
mH;AN =   edY N (B.107)
mH;AH =  (1 +   edY H) (B.108)
mH;B =   (cb  1) +   lb (B.109)
nTd = ctd 
1

rstd (B.110)
nT = ct  1

rst (B.111)
nB = cb  1 (B.112)
Structural equations dening the Maastricht variables:
bRt = bt+1   (1  cb)( bBt+1   bBt) + (bYt+1   bYt) +   ctd( bT dt+1   bT dt ) +   ct( bTt+1   bTt); (B.113)
bt = bH;t + b( bT dt   bT dt 1) + a( bTt   bTt 1); (B.114)
bSt = bSt 1 + bt + rstd( bT dt   bT dt 1) + rst( bTt   bTt 1): (B.115)
B.5 Reinterpretation of the Maastricht convergence criteria
We show how to reinterpret each of the Maastricht criteria in order to be able to use the method of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999).
B.5.1 Exchange rate criterion
We reinterpret the criterion on the nominal exchange rate (4.3) into two inequalities given below:39
E
 bSt  k  SD( bSt)   15%; (B.116)
39E stands for the expectation operator and SD stands for the standard deviation operator.
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E
 bSt+ k  SD( bSt)  15%: (B.117)
where k is large enough to prevent from violating the criterion (4.3) and SD refers to the standard
deviation statistic.
These two inequalities can be represented as the following two sets of inequalities (to conform with
the welfare measure we use discounted statistics):
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t
 bSt   ( 15%)  0
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t
 bSt   ( 15%)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t
 bSt   ( 15%)!2 ; (B.118)
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=0
t

15%  bSt  0
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t

15%  bSt2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t

15%  bSt!2 ; (B.119)
where K = 1 + k 2:
B.5.2 Ination criterion
We redene the condition (4.1). We assume that the average ination in the domestic economy
should be at least k standard deviations smaller than the average ination in the foreign economy
plus a margin summarized by B (where B = 4
p
1; 015  1):
E(bt)  E(bt ) +B   kSD(bt) (B.120)
where bt; bt are treated as deviations from the zero ination steady state in the domestic economy
and the foreign one accordingly (i.e.  =  = 0) and k large enough to prevent from violating
criterion (4.1). We assume that the foreign economy is in the steady state so bt = 0 8t: As a result
our restriction (B.120) becomes:
E(bt)  B   kSD(bt): (B.121)
Since B is a constant we can use the following property of the variance: V ar(bt) = V ar(B bt):
Our restriction becomes:
kSD(B   bt)  E(B   bt): (B.122)
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This restriction can be represented as a set of two restrictions:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t (B   t)  0; (B.123)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t (B   bt)2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t (B   bt)!2 : (B.124)
B.5.3 Nominal interest rate criterion
Similarly to the criterion on the CPI aggregate ination we interpret the inequality (4.2):
E( bRt)  E( bRt ) + CR   kSD( bRt) (B.125)
where k is large enough to prevent from frequent violating the criterion (4.2) and CR = 4
p
1; 02 1.
As in the case of the foreign ination we assume that bRt = 0 8t: So the restriction (B.125) becomes:
kSD(CR   bRt)  E(CR   bRt): (B.126)
This inequality can be represented as a set of two inequalities:
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t

CR   bRt  0; (B.127)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t

CR   bRt2  K  (1  )Et0 1X
t=t0
t

CR   bRt!2 : (B.128)
B.6 The constrained loss function
We provide the proof of the Proposition 1 stated in the main text. Since all the sets of the constraints
have a similar structure the proof concerns the optimal monetary policy with only one constraint on
the CPI ination rate. The proof is based on the proof of Proposition 6.9 in Woodford (2003).
Proposition 1 Consider the problem of minimizing an expected discounted sum of quadratic losses:
Et0
(
(1  )
1X
t=t0
tLt
)
(B.129)
subject to (4.4) - (4.5). Let m1;; m2; be the discounted average values of (B   bt) and (B   bt)2
associated with the optimal policy. Then the optimal policy also minimizes a modied discounted loss
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criterion of the form (B.129) with Lt replaced by:
eLt  Lt +(T   bt)2 (B.130)
under constraints represented by the structural equations. Importantly   0 and takes strictly
positive value if and only if the constraint (4.5) binds. Moreover if the constraint (4.5) binds the
corresponding target value T is negative and given by the following relation:
T = B  Km1; < 0: (B.131)
Proof. Let m1; and m2; be the discounted average values of (B   t) and (B   t)2 associated
with the policy that solves the constrained optimization problem stated in the corollary. Let m1;
and m2; be the values of these moments for the policy that minimizes (B.129) without additional
constraints. Notice that since m1; = B the constraint (4.4) does not bind.
40 We identify the
deterministic component of policy, i.e. m1; and also the stabilization component of policy which
is: m2;   (m1;)2. Moreover we also conclude that m1;  m1; since there is no advantage from
choosing m1; such that: m1; < m1; - both constraints set only the lower bound on the value of m1;
for any value of the stabilization component of policy. If one chooses m1; such that: m1; > m1;
then one can relax the constraint (4.5). So m1;  m1;. Based on the above discussion we formulate
two alternative constraints to the constraints (4.4, 4.5):
(1  )E0
1X
t=0
t (B   bt)  m1;; (B.132)
(1  )E0
1X
t=0
t (B   bt)2  m2;: (B.133)
Observe that any policy that satises the above constraints satises also the weaker constraints: (4.4,
4.5). Now we take advantage of the Kuhn Tucker theorem: the policy that minimizes (B.129) subject
to (B.132, B.133) also minimizes the following loss criterion:
E0
(
(1  )
1X
t=0
tLt
)
  1;E0
(
(1  )
1X
t=0
t (B   bt))+
2;E0
(
(1  )
1X
t=0
t (B   bt)2) (B.134)
40Means of all the variables under the unconstrained optimal policy are zero.
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where 1; and 2; are the Lagrange multipliers which are nonnegative. If (4.5) binds then we obtain
the following relation between the multipliers:
1; = 2Km1;2; (B.135)
since m2; = Km21;.
Rearranging the terms in (B.134) we can dene the new loss function as:
eLt  Lt + 2; (B   bt)  1;22;
2
(B.136)
where the nal term appears only when 2; > 0: Therefore  = 2;  0 and takes a strictly positive
value only if (4.5) binds. Moreover for  > 0 we have that:
T = B  
1;
22:
= B  Km1;: (B.137)
Notice that the target value for the CPI ination is negative (since K > 1 and m1;  B):
T = B  Km1; < 0: (B.138)
B.7 Constrained optimal monetary policy
We derive the rst order conditions for the optimal monetary policy that satisfy the additional criteria
on the nominal interest and the CPI aggregate ination.
minLt0 = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
Y (bYt   bY Tt )2 + 12Td( bT dt   bT dTt )2+
1
2
T ( bTt   bTTt )2 +TTd bT dt bTt +Y Td bYt bT dt +Y T bYt bTt+
1
2
Hb2H;t + 12N b2N;t + 12R( bRt  RT )2
+
1
2
(bt   T )2] + tip+O(3) (B.139)
subject to :
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bN;t = kN (mN;Y bYt +mN;Td bT dt +mN;T bTt +mN;AN bAN;t +mN;AH bAH;t
+mN;B bBt) + bN;t+1; (B.140)
bH;t = kH(mH;Y bYt +mH;Td bT dt +mH;T bTt +mH;AN bAN;t +mH;AH bAH;t
+mH;B bBt) + bH;t+1; (B.141)
bCt = bYt + nTd bT dt + nT bTt + nB bBt; (B.142)
bT dt   bT dt 1 = bN;t   bH;t   a( bTt   bTt 1); (B.143)
bRt = bbN;t+1 + (1  b)bH;t+1   (1  cb)( bBt+1   bBt)
+ (bYt+1   bYt) +   ctd( bT dt+1   bT dt )+
(  ct+ a(1  b))( bTt+1   bTt); (B.144)
bt = bbN;t + (1  b)bH;t + a(1  b)( bTt   bTt 1): (B.145)
First order conditions of the minimization problem:
 wrt bN;t :
0 = N bN;t + 1;t   1;t 1   4;t   b 15;t 1   b6;t; (B.146)
 wrt bH;t :
0 = HbH;t + 2;t   2;t 1 + 4;t   (1  b) 15;t 1   (1  b)6;t; (B.147)
 wrt bYt :
0 = Y (bYt   bY Tt ) + Y Td bT dt +Y T bTt   kNmN;Y 1;t
  kHmH;Y 2;t   3;t + 5;t    15;t 1; (B.148)
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 wrt bT dt :
0 = Td( bT dt   bT dTt ) + TTd bTt +Y Td bYt   kNmN;Td1;t
  kHmH;Td2;t   nTd3;t + 4;t
  4;t+1 + ctd5;t   ctd 15;t 1; (B.149)
 wrt bTt :
0 = T ( bTt   bTTt ) + TTd bT dt +Y T bYt   kNmN;T 1;t
  kHmH;T 2;t   nT 3;t + a4;t   a4;t+1
+ (ct+ a(1  b))5;t   (ct+ a(1  b)) 15;t 1
  a(1  b)6;t + a(1  b)6;t+1; (B.150)
 wrt bRt :
0 = R( bRt  RT ) + 5;t; (B.151)
 wrt bt :
0 = (bt   T ) + 6;t: (B.152)
B.8 The constrained loss function - general case
We provide the proposition41 that summarizes the discussion in Section 6 regarding the foreign econ-
omy. Since sets of the constraints for the CPI ination rate and the nominal interest rate have the
same structure the proposition concerns the optimal monetary policy with only one constraint on the
CPI ination rate.
Proposition 2 Consider the problem of minimizing an expected discounted sum of quadratic losses:
Et0
(
(1  )
1X
t=t0
tLt
)
(B.153)
subject to
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(B   bt + bt )  0; (B.154)
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(B   bt + bt )2  K
 
(1  )Et0
1X
t=t0
t(B   bt + bt )
!2
: (B.155)
41We do not present the proof for this proposition since it resembles to a great extent the proof of Proposition 2.
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Let n1;; n2; be the discounted average values of (B bt+bt ) and (B bt+bt )2 associated with the
optimal policy. Moreover assume that the average of the foreign CPI ination rate (m1;) satises
the following inequality: m1;   B: Then the optimal policy also minimizes a modied discounted
loss criterion of the form (B.153) with Lt replaced by:
eLt  Lt +(Tt   bt)2 (B.156)
under constraints represented by the structural equations. Importantly   0 and takes strictly
positive value if and only if the constraint (B.155) binds. Moreover if the constraint (B.155) binds the
corresponding target value Tt is given by the following relation:
Tt = B + bt  Kn1; < bt : (B.157)
B.9 Robustness analysis
We provide the results of our robustness analysis.
Table B.4: Robustness analysis - structural parameters
The unconstrained optimal policy and the Maastricht criteria
n 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.01 CPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nSOC
0.1 CPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.2 CPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.3 CPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.4 CPI CPI nCPI nCPI nCPI nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.5 CPI CPI nCPI nCPI nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.6 CPI CPI nCPI nCPI nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.7 CPI CPI CPI nCPI nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.8 CPI CPI CPI nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.9 CPI CPI CPI nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
note: CPI - CPI criterion satised; nCPI - CPI criterion not satised;
nSOC - second order conditions not satised
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Table B.5: Robustness analysis - structural parameters
The constrained optimal policy and the Maastricht criteria
n 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.01 nNER nNER nNER nNER nNER NER NER NER NER nSOC
0.1 nNER nNER nNER nNER NER NER NER nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.2 nNER nNER nNER nNER NER NER nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.3 nNER nNER nNER nNER NER nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.4 nNER nNER nNER nNER NER nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.5 nNER nNER nNER nNER nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.6 nNER nNER nNER nNER nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.7 nNER nNER nNER nNER nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.8 nNER nNER nNER nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
0.9 nNER nNER nNER nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC nSOC
note: NER - nominal exchange rate (NER) criterion satised;
nNER - NER criterion not satised; nSOC - second order conditions not satised
Table B.6: Robustness analysis - stochastic environment
variances of the Maastricht variables under the unconstrained policy (in (%)2)
shocks CPI ination nominal interest rate nominal exchange rate
AN ; AH ; B; C
 0.2638 0.3525 16.6195
AN ; B;C
 0.1252 0.1028 8.5792
AH ; B;C
 0.0649 0.1063 5.7338
AN ; AH 0.2372 0.3424 13.2265
ArN ; A
r
H ; B;C
 0.0356 0.0228 3.9607
bound 0.0356 0.0651 58.57
note: SD(ArN ) = 0:2SD(AN ); SD(A
r
H) = 0:2SD(AH)
where SD - standard deviation
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